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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In most countries the income tax system is based 
on a comprehensive tax: one tax rate is imposed 
on the total income of a taxpayer. In contrast, the 
Dual  Income  Tax  (DIT)  is  a  schedular  tax  that 
combines  a  progressive  tax  schedule  for  labor 
income with a flat tax rate on capital income. 
 
The introduction of such a tax is a hot topic world-
wide. Its possible advantages and drawbacks are 
discussed  not  only  in  the  European  Nordic 
countries which have introduced them some years 
ago,  but  also  in  the  rest  of  Europe  [see  e.g. 
Genser  and  Reutter 2007),  in  Japan    (Morinobu, 
2004),  and  in  Canada  (Sørensen,  2007).  Also  in 
Germany, economists and policy makers consider 
a dual income tax as an option for a fundamental 
tax  reform.  Recently,  the  SVR2008  published  an 
expertise commissioned by the German Ministry of 
Finance.
1  This  report  strongly  favors  the 
introduction of a Dual Income Tax reform, which is  
contrary  to  a  previous  proposal  of  the  German 
Council  of  Economic   Experts,  analyzed  by  Bach 
and Steiner (2007) - practically revenue neutral. 
 
Previous economic research on the impact of this 
proposal has concentrated on long-run effects and 
is mainly based on general equilibrium simulation 
models. The results of these  exercises are largely 
robust with respect to the choice of the behavioral 
elasticities,  with  one  important  exemption:  the 
labor supply elasticity. Actually, the labor supply 
elasticity is the only behavioral parameter that is 
crucial for the long run effects of a DIT. (See e.g. 
Radulescu (2007) for Germany, or Keuschnigg and 
Dietz  (2007),  p.  204,  for  Switzerland.)  General 
                                                 
1   A  more  comprehensive  version  of  this 
report, available only in German, includes 
an  elaborate  tax  amending  bill  of  the 
income tax law proposed (EStG -E).  (See 
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der 
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Max-
Planck-Institut  für  Geistiges  Eigentum, 
Wettbewerbs-  Und  Steuerrecht,  Zentrum 
für  Europä ische  Wirtschaftsforschung,   
2006). 
equilibrium  simulation  studies  assume  that  the 
household sector can be modelled by a traditional 
Ramsey  model  with  only    one  single 
“representative'' agent characterized by only  one 
labor  supply  elasticity.  Population  based 
microeconometric analyses show, however, that in 
the population labor supply elasticities vary widely 
depending on gender, number of children, regional 
and  other  factors.  This  suggests  to  supplement 
existing  macroeconomic  DIT  studies  by 
microeconometric simulation analyses. 
The  main  contribution  of  the  present  paper  is  a 
microsimulation analysis of the incentive effects of 
the most recent DIT proposal for Germany based 
on a behavioral microeconometric model. It is the 
first  evaluation  of  the  behavioral  effects  of  the 
income  tax  amendment  EStG-E  proposed  by  the 
Council  of  Economic  Experts  based  on  a  mixed 
logit simulation approach. This improves previous 
studies  based  on  a  traditional  conditional  logit 
model  and  older  data  sets  (Bach  and  Steiner, 
2007;  Wagenhals  and  Buck,  2009)  because  the 
conventional  IIA  assumption  implicit  in  the 
traditional model is strongly rejected by our data. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The 
next section describes the data: the generation of 
the base data set, the definition of the tax base, 
with special reference to the calculation of capital 
income  and  labor  income,  and  the  tax  schedule 
used. Then, two sections describe discrete choice 
models for single persons as well as for cohabiting 
and  married  couples.  They  provide  mixed  logit 
estimation and calibration techniques and present 
empirical results. The last section concludes. 
2.  DATA 
2.1.  Base Data Set 
My base data set is drawn from the 2005 wave of 
the  German  Socio-Economic  Panel  (GSOEP).  I 
merge  some  retrospective  data  from  the  2006 
wave, such that the base data set refers to 2005, 
the  same  fiscal  year  the  German  Council  of 
Economic Experts reform proposal refers to. 
 
Choice alternatives are generated using GMOD, a 
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developed  by  the  author.  GMOD  calculates 
personal  income  taxes,  social  security 
contributions  and  benefits.  It  allows  for  the 
standard  benefits  and  tax  concessions  such  as 
housing benefits and child-benefits, allowances for 
child-raising, child-raising leave and maternity as 
well  as  assistance  for  education  or  vocational 
training.  Furthermore,  it  accounts  for  tax 
abatements  for  dependent  children  and  for  the 
education  of  dependent  children,  for  child-care, 
tax  credits  for  single  parents,  maintenance 
payments  and  income-splitting  for  married 
couples. 
2.2.  Tax Base. 
A  dual  income  tax  differentiates  between  capital 
and labor income and taxes these differently. So I 
have  to  derive  two  tax  bases,  one  for  capital 
income,  and  one  for  other  sources  of  household 
income, called “labor income''. 
 
Currently,  GMOD  calculates  seven  sources  of 
income, because the current German Income Tax 
Law  (Einkommensteuergesetz,  EStG)  levies  one 
tax  schedule  on  the  sum  of  income  from  the 
following  exhaustive  list  of  seven  sources  of 
income: (1) income from agriculture and forestry 
(§ 13  EStG),  (2)  income  from  trade  or  business 
(§ 15  EStG),  (3)  income  from  independent 
personal  services  (§ 18  EStG),  (4)  income  from 
dependent  personal  services,  i.e.  wages,  salaries 
and  retirement  benefits  of  civil  servants  ( § 19 
EStG),  (5)  income  from  investment  of  capital  ( §  
20  EStG),  (6)  income  from  rentals  and  royalties 
(§ 21  EStG),  and  (7)  other  income  designated  in 
§ 22 EStG, e.g. notational return on investment of 
a  pension  from  statutory  pensions  insurance. 
Gross  earnings  from  all  of  these  sources  are 
calculated  by  GMOD  based  on  information 
available in my base data set described above, on 
the  German  income  tax  law  and  on  income  tax 
directives. Net income from the first three sources 
is  calculated  on  the  accrual  basis  and  called 
“profit-based income''. Net income from the other 
four  sources  is  defined  as  the  excess  of  total 
receipts over income-related expenses. 
 
According to the German Income Tax Law (EStG-
E) as proposed by the SVR2008, there will be four 
categories of income (see § 2 EStG-E): (1) income 
from  business  activities  ( § 13,  §   15  and  § 18 
EStG-E),  (2)  income  from  employment  ( § 19 
EStG-E), (3) capital income (§ 20, § 21, and § 22 
EStG-E), and (4) derived income (§ 23 EStG-E). 
 
To map the traditional seven sources of income to 
the  new  categories  capital  and  labor  income  I 
proceed  as  follows:  (1)  Income  from  business 
activities corresponds to traditional ``profit based 
income''.  (2)  Income  f rom  employment 
corresponds  to  the  traditional  income  from 
dependent  personal  services.  (3)  Income  from 
capital  assets  is  derived  from  traditional  income 
from capital investments (§ 20 EStG) and income 
from  rentals  and  royalties  ( § 21  EStG).  (4) 
Derived  income  corresponds  to  traditional  “other 
income'' designated in § 22 EStG. In my base data 
set,  I  do  not  have  information  on  income  from 
private sale transactions mentioned in § 22 EStG-
E, so I have to ignore it. I assume that the cash 
method  of  accounting  is  use d  with  respect  to 
income  from  business  activities.  Thus,  taxpayers 
report  their  revenues  when  received  and  their 
expenses when paid. 
 
The  labor  income  tax  base  includes  wages, 
salaries  (including  the  employers'  calculatory 
salaries) and civil pensions. The capital income tax 
base  includes  business  profits,  dividends,  capital 
gains,  interest  and  rental  income.  Taxable  labor 
income  and  taxable  capital  income  are  obtained 
by  subtracting  personal  allowances  and  other 
deductions  from  the  respective  tax  base.  The  
savings allowance of 750 Euro for the income from 
capital investments  (§ 20  section  4  EStG)  will  be 
abolished. 
 
The  decomposition  of  profit -based  income  in  a 
capital  and  a  labor  share  is  the  crux  of  the  DIT. 
The calculatory salary, i.e. the labor income of the 
self-employed,  is  hard  for  an  individual  to 
measure  and  even  harder  for  tax  authorities  to 
verify. I use the following trick: First, I estimate a 
Mincer-type  wage  function  based  on  observable 
characteristics  on  the  sub -sample  of  wage 
earners.  In  my  da ta  I  observe  determinants  of 
wages for all individuals. Therefore, I am able to 
predict the calculatory salary for all self-employed 
individuals. Finally, I derive their capital income as 
the residual. (See Wagenhals and Buck, 2009, for 
details about this decomposition approach.) In my 
view, this approach improves upon the procedure 
of  using  an  arbitrary  sharing  rule  (see  e.g.  
Gottfried and Witczak, 2009). In any case, due to 
data  constraints,  I  did  not  have  the  option  to 
compute calculatory salaries for the self-employed 
as residual profits. 
2.3.  Tax Schedule 
The dual income tax combines a progressive tax 
schedule for labor income with a flat tax rate on 
capital income. 
 
I assume that labor income is taxed according to 
the  current  income  tax  schedule  (§ 32  a  EStG ), 
and that capital income is taxed with a rate of 25 
percent  (including  the  solidarity  surcharge).  To 
avoid legal concerns and a potential deterioration 
with respect to the current legal position I follow 
the  German  Council  of  Economic  Experts  (2008, 
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Figure 1  Marginal tax rates  
 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
§ 32  a  EStG -E  defines  the  DIT  income  tax 
function:  Let  v   denote  taxable  income  in  Euro 
(rounded down to the next Euro) according to §  2 
Section  5  Clause  1  EStG -E,  and  let  K   denote 
capital  income  in  the  sense  of  §   2  Section  3 
Clause  2  EStG-E  (also  rounded  down  to the  next 




T = 0   if  7664 v   
T = 883.74x
2 + 1500x   if 7665 12584 v    
T = (ν - 12584)  + 952   if 12585 12585 vK      
T = 883.74y
2 + 1500y +   K   if 12586 12739 K v K       
T = 228.74z
2 + 2.397z + 989 +   K   if 12740 52151 K v K       




x     =    (v -7664)/10000  
y     =    (v -7664-K )/10000  
z     =    (v -12739-K )/10000  
 
( ,, x y z  are also rounded down to the next Euro). 
The  symbol  t   denotes  the  solidarity  surcharge 
(i.e. currently t =0.055). 
 
Figure  1  shows  marginal  tax  rates,  i.e.  the  tax 
rates that apply to the last Euro of the tax base. It 
compares the current marginal tax schedule  
 
(based on §  32 a EStG) with the DIT schedule for 
taxpayers  with  fixed  taxable  capital  incomes  of 
different  amounts.  The  solid  line  shows  the 
current  tax  rates  (T  2005).  Under  a  dual  tax 
regime  this  line  refers  to  taxpayers  without  any 
capital income. For taxpayers with capital income 
a  so-called  stretched  tax  scale  is  applied.  This 
means  that  the  taxation  of  capital  income  is 
incorporated  in  the  tax  schedule  in  terms  of  a 
proportional  zone.  The  length  of  this  variable 
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taxable capital income. The return component of 
income  is  taxed  proportionally  while  any  profits 
beyond  those  are  taxed  progressively  as  labor 
income. As examples, I use marginal tax rates for 
capital  incomes  of  10,000,  20,000  and  30,000 
Euro. 
3.  LABOUR SUPPLY OF SINGLE PERSONS 
To  quantify  the  labor  supply  incentives  of  a  DIT 
introduction,  I  use  a  discrete  choice  structural 
labor  supply  model.  The  basic  idea  is  to  replace 
the budget set of a household with a finite number 
of points, and optimize over this set of points. I 
first set out the theory, estimation and simulation 
results for single persons. In the following section, 
I turn to persons living in couples. 
3.1.  Theory 
I  represent  any  individual's  choice  set  by  a  six-
state labor supply regime and approximate actual 
hours  per  week 
a h   by  hours  levels 
:={0,10,20,30,40,50} hH   applying  the 
following rounding rule  
  =0 <5
a h if h  
  =10 5 <15
a if h   
   
  =50 45.
a if h   
For  all  elements h   in  the  choice  set H   I  use 
GMOD to calculate household net incomes as  
( )= ( , , | ) c h wh T h w   x  
where  w   denotes  the  gross  wage  rate,    is 
income from sources other than employment  and 
() T    is  the  tax-benefit  function  conditional  on  a 
vector  of  observed  characteristics x .  I  assume 
that  preferences  can  be  represented  by  a  utility 
function  U   and  that  individuals  act  as  if  to 
maximize utility  
( ( ), | ) max
h





subject to the budget constraint  
( ) ( , , | ) c h wh T h w     x  
where h  denotes total time endowment. 
 
To  obtain  random  utilities  (needed  for  estimation 
and  simulation),  I  add  state -specific  random 
errors  () eh  to utilities for all states hH . This 
gives random utilities  
 
*( ):= ( ( ), | ) ( ) U h U c h h h e h  x   (1) 
If the state-specific random errors are i.i.d. Type I 
extreme value distributed, then the probability P  
of working 
j h  hours is  
exp[ ( ( ), | )]
( = | ) =




U c h h h
P h h









For the specification of the utility function, I follow 
the tradition started by Keane and Moffit (1998) 
and choose a flexible form quadratic direct utility 
function.  Written  in  te rms  of  individual 
consumption  = ( ) c c h   and  leisure  := l h h    I 
obtain  
22 ( , ) = cc ll cl c l U c l c l cl c l           
where  , , , cc ll cl c       and  l    denote  unknown 
parameters.  I  assume  that  preferences  vary 
through  taste -shifters  on  income  and  leisure 
coefficients:  
 
0 = cc   c xg  
 
0 = ll   l xg  
where 
00 ,, cl  c g   and  l g   denote  unknown 
coefficients  and  x  is  a  (row)  v ector  of  individual 
characteristics
2  and  following  van  Soest  (1995) 
dummy variables for part-time categories in order 
to capture the disutility of inflexible arrangements 
in the utility functions. 
I deal with unobserved wage rates by estimating 
the  expected  market  wage  rates  conditional  on 
observed  characteristics  using  Heckman's  two -
step  approach:  I  first  estimate  a  reduced  form 
participation equation, get the Mill's rate and use 
it in a Mincer -type wage equation to correct for 
sample  selection  bias.  I  acc ount  for  wage  rate 
prediction  errors  by  integrating  out  the 
disturbance  term  of  the  wage  equation  in  the 
likelihood as suggested by van Soest (1995). 
 
Estimation of the unknown preference parameters 
is  based  on  a  mixed  logit  model  proposed  by 
McFadden and Train (2000). Under mild regularity 
conditions,  it  can  approximate  the  choice 
probabilities of any discrete choice model derived 
from  random  utility  maximization  as  closely  as 
desired.  Under  the  assumption  that  the  income 
coefficients are normally distributed and all other 
coefficients  are  fixed  I  proceed  by  maximum 
simulated likelihood. 
3.1.1.  Simulation. 
I  use  the  parameters  of  the  estimated  utility 
functions  to  simulate  the  effects  of  the 
introduction of a Dual Income Tax on labor supply 
following  the  individual  calibration  procedure 
described by Kreedy and Kalb (2005, page 720 et 
seq.)  Based  on  the  selected  sample  I  use  hours 
worked to obtain a starting point for simulation. 
 
For each individual, unobserved utility components 
(error terms) are drawn from the type I extreme 
value  distribution  and  added  to  the  measured 
utility  in  each  of  the  hours  points.  A  draw  is 
                                                 
2   Individual  characteristics  embedded  are  age 
and  age  squared,  place  of  residence  in  East 
Germany  (yes=1,  no=0),  nursing  case  in  the 
family  (yes=1,  no=0),  citizenship  (not 
German=1,  German=0),  high  education,  i.e. 
degree from universities or from universities of 
applied sciences (yes=1, no=0), low education, 
i.e. no vocational qualification attained (yes=1, 
no=0),  handicapped  person  (yes=1,  no=0), 
number  of  children  under  6,  and  number  of 
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accepted, if it results in the observed labor supply 
being  the  optimal  choice  for  the  individual. 
Otherwise, the draw is rejected, and another error 
term is drawn and checked. This is repeated until 
all  sets  of  error  terms  are  drawn  and  accepted. 
For each individual in the sample, this exercise is 
repeated 100 times. 
 
The  resulting  sets  of  error  terms  drawn  are 
possible  values  leading  to  the  observed  hours 
worked.  Given  individual  characteristics  and  the 
draws, I can determine post-reform utility at each 
hours point. This generates a distribution of post-
reform hours worked, conditional on the observed 
pre-reform hours, for each individual. The results 
of  the  draws  can  be  summarized  in  transition 
tables. 
 
3.2.  Empirical results 
3.2.1.  Sample Selection. 
The starting point for my sample is the base data 
file described above. First, I concentrate on single 
adult  respondents.  I  exclude  persons  younger 
than 25 or older than 55 years of age, persons in 
education, pensioners, persons doing compulsory 
community or military services, persons receiving 
profit  incomes  only  and  civil  servants.  After 
dropping  persons  with  missing  observations  of 
crucial  variables,  I  receive  a  sample  with  1,116 
single men and another sample with 1,312 single 
women. 
 
3.2.2.  Estimation. 
The  main  preference  parameter  estimates  for 
single men and single women are given in Table 4 
in the Appendix. The estimated parameter values 
are consistent with economic theory. The marginal 
utility of net income and of leisure are statistically 
significant at least at the five percent level, they 
are  positive  and  declining  with  income.  The 
interaction  effect  between  leisure  and  income  is 
practically  zero.  Not  surprisingly,  there  is  less 
desire to work if an individual is handicapped, or if 
there  is  a  nursing  case  in  the  family.  For  single 
mothers,  there  is  less  desire  to  work,  the  effect 
being  smaller  for  older  children.  The  main 
difference  between  male  and  female  preferences 
is  the  role  of  children:  While  the  number  of 
children in different age groups has the expected 
sign  and  magnitude  for  women,  these  variables 
were not significant for men and so were dropped. 
 
In  Table  4  I  do  not  report  the  estimates  of  the 
part-time  dummies  for  part-time  choice 
opportunities.  For  men  and  women,  they  all  are 
negative  and  highly  significant.  This  reflects  the 
fact  that  low  demand  for  part-time  workers 
requires more effort (and hence less utility) to find 
part-time employment. Furthermore, all estimated 
standard  errors  of  the  random  coefficients  were 
highly  significant.  This  suggests  considerable 
unobserved  heterogeneity  of  preferences.  The 
traditional  conditional  logit  approach  is  strongly 
rejected! 
3.2.3.  Simulation. 
Tables 1 and 2 present the simulation results for 
the  labor  supply  of  single  persons.  The  last 
column  gives  the  distribution  of  labor  supply 
before  the  reform,  the  last  row  refers  to  the 
distribution after the reform. The numbers inside 
the  matrix  are  row  percentages  indicating  the 





                                                 
3   See Kreedy and Kalb (2005) for a very detailed 
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Table 1  Labor Supply Transition Matrix for Single Men     
 
      Post-reform hours  
Pre-reform 
hours  
 0    10    20    30    40    50    % (row)  
 0    16.55    0.00    0.01    0.26    0.56    0.20    17.59  
10    0.00    2.12    0.00    0.04    0.05    0.08    2.29  
20    0.00    0.00    1.79    0.01    0.02    0.04    1.85  
30    0.00    0.00    0.00    17.43   0.20    0.13    17.77  
40    0.01    0.00    0.00    0.01    42.05    0.24    42.30  
50    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.03    18.18    18.21  
 % 
(column)  
 16.56    2.12    1.79    17.75    42.91    18.87    100.00  
Source: Own calculations. Any summing errors are due to rounding.  
 
 
Table 2  Labor Supply Transition Matrix for Single Women 
 
      Post-reform hours  
Pre-reform 
hours  
 0    10    20    30    40    50    % (row)  
 0    17.54    0.07    1.27    3.32    2.78    0.21    25.19  
10    0.04    4.02    0.18    0.66    0.53    0.08    5.51  
20    0.04    0.02    8.49    0.46    0.42    0.08    9.50  
30    0.17    0.00    0.02    20.72   0.30    0.05    21.27  
40    0.17    0.02    0.03    0.05    31.77    0.02    32.05  
50    0.14    0.01    0.10    0.09    0.08    6.07    6.49  
 % 
(column)  
 18.11    4.13    10.09    25.29    35.88    6.50    100.00  
Source: Own calculations. Any summing errors are due to rounding.  
 
My  results  suggest  that  -  in  a  short  run  partial 
equilibrium  view  -  the  DIT  reform  suggested  by 
the  German  Council  of  Economic  Experts  (2008) 
will generate only small labor supply reactions. For 
single  persons,  on  average,  they  will  be  slightly 
positive. 
4.  LABOR SUPPLY OF COUPLES 
4.1.  Theory 
For married or cohabiting couples I allow for joint 
decision  making.  Each  partner  may  account  for 
the decision of the other partner when deciding on 
hours  worked.  I  assume  that  each  household 
member  selects  one  of  six  regimes:  non-
participation  or  one  of  five  employment  states 
={0,10,20,30,40,50} H   (the  elements 
denoting hours per week). Thus, the choice set for 
couples is   HH . Actual individual working hours 
observed in the data are rounded (as above) to fit 
the elements in this set. 
 
I  assume  th at  preferences  of  a  couple  may  be 
represented by a flexible quadratic utility function  
 
2 2 2 ( , , ) = f m cc mm m f f f U c l l c l l      
  cm m cf f fm f m cl cl l l        
  c m m f f c l l        
 
Here  := mm l h h  ,  := ff l h h  ; l  denotes leisure 
and  h  hours worked of male (m ) or female ( f ) 
persons,  while  c  denotes  their  joint  net  income. 
The     and     coefficients  are  unknow n 
population parameters. The sign of  fm   indicates 
whether  male  and  female  leisure  are  substitutes 
or  complements.  Similar  to  the  case  of  single 
persons,  some  preference  parameters  depend  on 
personal,  household  and  other  characteristics. 
Supplementing  representative  household  utility  I 
add stochastic terms accounting for state specific 
errors (needed for estimation and simulation) and 
finally  derive  the  probability  of  choosing  any 
consumption-leisure  combination  in  the  set  of 
feasible household decisions. Estimation proceeds 
via  mixed  logit  and  simulation  by  calibration
4  as 
described  above.  I  derive  household  gross 
earnings  assuming  state  invariant  male  and 
female  gross  wage  rates,  and  calculate  the 
corresponding state specific net household income 
for  each  ho urs  combination  in  the  choice  set 
 HH   using  GMOD  and  my  base  data  set 
described above. 
 
                                                 
4   ''Individual''  calibration  no w  refers  to 
calibration based on the estimated preference 
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4.2.  Empirical results 
4.2.1.  Sample Selection. 
Starting  point  for  my  analysis  is  again  the  base 
data  file  described  above,  now  concentrating  on 
couples.  I  apply  the  sample  selection  criteria  as 
described for singles to both partners and obtain a 
sample of 2,015 couples. 
4.2.2.  Estimation. 
The  main  preference  parameter  estimates  for 
married and cohabiting couples are given in Table 
3  in  the  Appendix.  The  estimated  parameter 
values  are  consistent  with  economic  theory.  The 
marginal utility of both partners' leisures and the 
marginal  utility  of  net  income  are  highly 
significant,  positive  and  declining  with  income. 
The  interaction  effect  between  male  and  female 
leisure is statistically not different from zero and 
practically unimportant. Not surprisingly, there is 
less desire to work for mothers, the effect being 
smaller for older children. 
 
 
Due  to  space  restrictions,  in  Table  6  I  do  not 
report the estimates of the part-time dummies for 
part-time choice opportunities. (But they are used 
in the simulation exercises.) For both sexes, they 
all  are  negative  and  highly  significant.  As  in  the 
case  of  singles,  this  reflects  the  fact  that  low 
demand  for  part-time  workers  requires  more 
effort  to  find  part-time  employment.  Again,  all 
estimated  standard  errors  of  the  random 
coefficients were highly significant. As for singles, 
this  suggests  considerable  unobserved 
heterogeneity  of  preferences  of  couples.  Again, 
the  traditional  conditional  logit  approach  is 
strongly rejected! 
4.2.3.  Simulation. 
Tables 3 and 4 show that the partial equilibrium 
impact of the reform proposal on the labor supply 
of  couples  is  relatively  small.  As  was  to  be 
expected, positive incentive effects are most likely 
for married females. This result, not shown in an 
extra  table,  is  in  line  with  the  vast  majority  of 
previous studies on female labor supply. 
 
 
Table 3: Labor Supply Transition Matrix for Men in Couples   
  
      Post-reform hours  
Pre-reform 
hours  
 0    10    20    30    40    50    % (row)  
 0    9.41    0.00    0.01    0.03    0.08    0.06    9.59  
10    0.00    0.48    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.00    0.49  
20    0.00    0.00    1.00    0.00    0.01    0.00    1.02  
30    0.03    0.00    0.00    16.38    0.10    0.10    16.61  
40    0.08    0.00    0.02    0.12    50.31    0.13    50.66  
50    0.04    0.00    0.01    0.05    0.18    21.35    21.62  
 % 
(column)  
 9.55    0.49    1.05    16.58    50.68    21.65    100.00  
Source: Own calculations. Any summing errors are due to rounding.  
Table 4:  Labor Supply Transition Matrix for Women in Couples  
  
      Post-reform hours  
Pre-reform 
hours  
 0    10    20    30    40    50    % (row)  
 0    33.78    0.14    0.26    0.19    0.24    0.02    34.63  
10    0.02    10.88    0.05    0.07    0.02    0.00    11.05  
20    0.01    0.00    15.71    0.02    0.06    0.00    15.82  
30    0.01    0.02    0.03    16.63    0.07    0.04    16.81  
40    0.00    0.00    0.01    0.02    17.96    0.04    18.04  
50    0.00    0.00    0.01    0.01    0.01    3.62    3.66  
 % 
(column)  
 33.83    11.05    16.07    16.95    18.37    3.73    100.00  
Source: Own calculations. Any summing errors are due to rounding.  
 
5.  AGGREGATE RESULTS 
If  I  finally  aggregate  my  results  over  persons 
living  as  singles  and  living  in  couples,  I  find  a 
positive  incentive  effect  of  the  introduction  of  a 
DIT. On average, labor supply increases. But does 
working time increase as well? 
If you accept my results and the German Council 
of Economic Experts assumption of a 1.1 percent 
reform-induced increase in labor demand, then in 
the  whole  economy  annual  working  time  will 
increase  on  average  and  in  the  aggregate.  This 
effect,  combined  with the  smaller  tax  burden  on 
capital income, yields an increase in aggregate net 
income. Thus, a DIT induced demand-side driven 
growth - as suggested by CGE studies - is indeed 
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6.  CONCLUSION 
This  paper  evaluates  the  incentive  effects  of  a 
Dual  Income  Tax  reform  in  Germany  based  on 
GMOD, a tax-benefit microsimulation model, and 
on  a  sample  of  thousands  of  households 
representative for the German population. Instead 
of  invoking  the  assumption  of    one  given  labor 
supply  elasticity  as  current  general  equilibrium 
simulation  models  do,  I  allow  for  labor  supply 
responses  of  the  persons  in  a  sample 
representative  for  the  resident  population  in 
Germany. I do not present estimated elasticities, 
but my results are based on estimated responses 
of  individuals  in  a  representative  sample. 
Estimates  are  obtained  with  a  highly  flexible 
mixed  logit  simulation  approach.  It  includes  the 
traditional conditional logit model used in a former 
study as a special case (which is rejected). 
The  main  finding  is  that  reform  induced  labor 
supply  responses  are  small,  but  -  on  average  - 
positive. Thus, my results empirically support the 
central, but untested, labor supply assumptions in 
traditional CGE models. 
 
Further research is needed to assess the detailed 
impact of a DIT in Germany on the distribution of 
income  and  of  individual  economic  welfare.  This 
promises additional advantages in policy advising 
in  comparison  to  computable  equilibrium 
simulation  models  and  may  be  a  useful 
supplementation to these approaches. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 5:  Estimated Preference Parameters, Singles  
 
    Single Men  Single Women 
 Income    0.0680    0.183
**   
   (0.0363)    (0.0630)  
Income
2     -0.000264    -0.00291
*   
   (0.000403)    (0.00121)  
Leisure    0.371
***     0.842
***   
   (0.0806)    (0.123)  
Leisure
2     -0.00287
***     -0.00469
***   
   (0.000399)    (0.000496)  
Leisure*income    -0.00128    -0.00233
**   
   (0.000653)    (0.000779)  
Leisure*age    -0.00425    -0.0159
**   
   (0.00361)    (0.00536)  
Leisure*age
2     0.0000545    0.000205
**   
   (0.0000464)    (0.0000682)  
Leisure*(East Germany?)    0.0218
*     -0.00203  
   (0.00872)    (0.00982)  
Leisure*(Nursing case in family?)    0.0126    -0.00950  
   (0.0240)    (0.0215)  
Leisure*foreign?    0.0297
**     -0.0209  
   (0.0112)    (0.0190)  
Leisure*(high education?)    -0.0355
**     -0.0289
**   
   (0.0113)    (0.0104)  
Leisure*(low education?)    0.0229
**     0.0300
*   
   (0.00848)    (0.0147)  
Leisure*handicapped?    0.0363
**     0.00161  
   (0.0133)    (0.0226)  
Leisure*(no. of kids under 6)       0.0700
***   
      (0.0122)  
Leisure*(no. of kids age 6-16)       0.0358
***   
      (0.00662)  
 Standard Deviation        
Income    0.0902
***     0.154
***   
   (0.0225)    (0.0307)  
 Observations    1116    1312  
  Standard errors in parentheses 
  
*
  < 0.05 p ,  
**
  < 0.01 p ,  
***
  <0.001 p  
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Table 6: Estimated Preference Parameters, Couples  
 
    Coefficient  Std. Err. 
 Income    0.0644
**     (0.0197)  
Income
2     0.0000154    (0.0000644)  
Female's leisure    0.486
***     (0.108)  
(Female's leisure)
2     -0.00364
***     (0.000661)  
Male's leisure    0.268
*     (0.107)  
(Male's leisure)
2     -0.00319
***     (0.000315)  
(Female's leisure)*(male's leisure)    -0.000448    (0.000282)  
(Female's leisure)*(female's*age)    -0.00333    (0.00360)  
(Female's leisure)*(female's*age)
2     0.0000542    (0.0000450)  
(Female's leisure)*(East Germany?)    -0.0434
***     (0.00763)  
(Female's leisure)*(no. of kids under 6)    0.0701
***     (0.0101)  
(Female's leisure)*(no. of kids aged 6-
16)  
 0.0301
***     (0.00492)  
(Female's  leisure)*(nursing  case  in 
family?)  
 0.0346    (0.0181)  
(Female's leisure)*(married?)    0.0320
**     (0.0108)  
(Male's leisure)*(male's*age)    0.00514    (0.00470)  
(Male's leisure)*(male's*age)
2     -0.0000484    (0.0000555)  
(Male's leisure)*(East Germany?)    0.00857    (0.00881)  
(Male's leisure)*(no. of kids under 6)    0.00257    (0.00715)  
(Male's leisure)*(no. of kids aged 6-16)    0.000312    (0.00439)  
(Male's  leisure)*(nursing  case  in 
family?)  
 0.0181    (0.0126)  
(Male's leisure)*(married?)    -0.0158    (0.0110)  
 Standard Deviation     
Income    0.0745
**   
   (0.0233)  
 Sample Size    2015 
Log-likelihood    -14161577 
   
*
  < 0.05 p ,  
**
  < 0.01 p ,  
***
  <0.001 p   
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